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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the effects of fiscal policy on investment using a panel of OECD
countries.  In particular, we investigate how different types of fiscal policy affect profits and , as a
result, investment.
We find a sizable negative effect of public spending -- and in particular of its public wage
component -- on business investment.  This result is consistent with models in which government
employment creates wage pressure for the private sector.  Various types of taxes also have negative
effects on profits, but, interestingly, the effects of government spending on investment are larger than
the effect of taxes.  Our results have important implications for the so called “non-Keynesian” (i.e.
expansionary) effects of fiscal adjustments.
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In the last three decades, fiscal policy in manyOECD countries has experi-
enced large swings. In the seventies and early eighties,fiscal profligacy led
to the accumulation of large deficits. Then,from the mid eighties onward,
several countries implemented fiscal adjustments which,with different degree
of success, slowed the growth of public debts.
Looking at this evidence, a lively recent literaturehas pointed out the
importance of the so called "non keynesian"effects of fiscal policy. Starting
with Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), several authors havenoted that some (but
not all) fiscal contractions have been expansionary, evenin the very short
run, in contrast to the predictionof standard models driven by aggregate
demand. Even though episodes of rapid fiscal expansionshave been relatively
less studied, Alesina and Ardagna (1998) showevidence of "non keynesian
effects" in this direction as well, namely they point outthat several fiscal
expansions have been contractionary.
Most of the empirical literature has focused on theeffects of large fis-
cal contractions (expansions) on private consumption';however, as noted,
for instance, by Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), even a cursorylook at
episodes of large swings in fiscal policy suggeststhat private investment ex-
plains a disproportionate share of the responseof GDP growth to these large
changes in the fiscal stance.
The motivation of this paper is that in order to betterunderstand the
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries, oneneeds to shift
the focus of the analysis to business investments.
Needless to say, this is not the first paper on the effectsof fiscal policy on
investment. A large and important literature studiesthe effects of taxes on
the cost of capital, using either aggregate or firm leveldata. However, due to
the amount of information needed to construct a good measureof the cost of
capital, this approach tends to be country specific2.In the macroeconomic
'For the theorethical work on "non-Keynesian" effects of fiscal adjustments seeBlan-
chard (1990), Drazen (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Sutherland (1997),and Perotti
(1999); for empirical work see Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996),Giavazzi, Jappelli and
Pagano (1998) and Perotti (1999). All these papersfocus on consumption.
2See, for example, Hasset and Hubbard (1996) and Chirinko (1993)for a review. For
3literature, a recent strand of research usesnumerical solutions of real busi-
ness cycles models with perfectly competitivefactor and output markets to
evaluate the effects of fiscal policy oninvestment3. This literature focuses
on the supply-side responses of capitaland labor to changes in spending and
taxation and its based on calibration methods.
In this paper, instead, we do not use calibration but we rely oneconomet-
ric evidence on a panel of OECD countries to assessthe effects of taxation
and expenditure on investment. We focus on therole of profits as a deter-
minant of investment and we show below that the compositionof changes in
fiscal policy is particularly important for profits. We share ouremphasis on
profits and the supply-side with Bruno andSachs (1985), Blanchard (1997)
and Lane and Perotti (1999). We share the focus on compositionof fiscal
policy with Alesina and Perotti (1995), (1997a),Giavazzi and Pagano (1996),
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (1998), Mc Dermottand Wescott (1996), and
Alesina and Ardagna (1998).
We reach several conclusions. First, increases (reductions)of public
spending reduce (increase) profits and, therefore,investment. The magni-
tude of these effects is substantial. A reduction by one percentagepoint in
the ratio of primary spending over GDP leads to anincrease in investment
by 0.16 percentage points of GDP on impact,and a cumulative increase by
0.50 after two years and 0.80 percentage points ofGDP after five years. The
effect is particularly strong when the spending cut falls on government wages:
in response to a cut in the public wage bill by 1 percentof GDP, the figures
above become 0.51, 1.83 and 2.77 per cent, respectively.
Second, increases (reductions) in taxes reduce (increase)profits and in-
vestment, but the magnitude of these tax effectsis smaller than those on
the expenditure side. In accordance to our emphasis onlabor markets ef-
fects of fiscal policy, taxes on labor have the largesteffects on profits. For
instance, an increase of one percentage pointof GDP of taxes on labor leads
to a reduction of the investment over GDP ratio by0.17 on impact and a
cumulative effect of about 0.7 in five years. We argue thatthis effect is due
to the fact that higher labor taxes imply higher pre tax wagesdemanded by
recent contributions using firm level panel data see Devereux,Keen and Schiantarelli
(1994) for the UK and Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999)for the US. For international
evidence see Cummins, Hasset and Hubbard (1995).
3See Barro (1989) Baxter and King, (1993), Dotsey and Mao (1994), Ludvigson (1996),
Ohanian (1997), Finn (1998), Olivei, (1998).
4workers .'
Third,the magnitude of our coefficients suggests thatthere may be noth-
ing special in the behavior of investmentat the time of expansionary fiscal ad-
justments. As shown by Alesinaand Perotti (1997) and Alesina and Ardagna
(1998), expansionary fiscal adjustments are on averageimplemented mostly
by spending cuts, particularly on government wagesand transfers, while con-
tractionary ones are characterized by taxincreases. The estimated effect of
spending and taxes on investment implythat the different composition of the
stabilization package can account for the observeddifference in investment
growth rates. We do not find significant"non linearities" or structural breaks
in the reaction of investment around largefiscal consolidations.5 This result
suggests that we may not need "specialtheories" to explain episodes of large
fiscal adjustments.
This paper is organized as follows. Section2 develops a model of in-
vestment, profits and fiscal policy. Sections3 discusses the data. Section 4
displays our main results on profits andinvestment and illustrates the quan-
titative effects from different types of fiscal policy oninvestment. Section 5
discusses the sensitivity and robustness of ourresults. Section 6 relates our
results to the empirical evidence on large fiscal adjustments.The last section
concludes.
2 Theory
2.1 Profits, investment andfiscal policy
We discuss the link between fiscal policy andinvestment using a standard
investment model with convex adjustment costs asin Abel and Blanchard
(1986). A vast literature has investigatedthe role of the tax code, like de-
preciation allowances, investment tax credits,and deductability of interest
payments, etc. on the computationof the costs of capital. Although the
cost of capital has been found to be significantlyrelated to investment, the
elasticity tends to be small (see for instanceChirinko and Fazzari (1998)).
Thus, the effects of fiscal policy throughthis channel are not likely to be
large. Moreover, it is far from clearthat a careful modelling of tax incentives
4This effect can occur both in competitive and unionizedlabor markets. For more
discussion of this point and for direct evidence, see Alesinaand Perotti (1997).
5This result is consistent with the empirical evidence of Ardagna (1999).
5makes much difference6. Here we depart from this literature by emphasizing
effects of fiscal policy which operate mainly through the labormarket.
Firms maximize the expected present discounted value ofcash flow, Vt:
=EH(1+rt+8)1(1_Tt+s)[F(Kt+j,Lt+j)
—H(K+,I+)—wt+Lt+ —
t=O s=O
(1)
subject to the capital accumulation equation
K =K_1(1
—5)+ I (2)
K is the capital stock, It the rate of gross investment, Lis labor input, Tt
isthe one period (expected) market rate of return, tthetax rate on profits,
and S the rate of depreciation. F(K, L) —H(K,i) is the net production
function where H(K, I) describes the cost of adjusting the capitalstock
which is convex in I,.
Equation (1) assumes that the firm is perfectly competitive,capital be-
comes productive immediately, the price of investment goodsrelative to the
output price is one and investment expenditures attime t are fully tax de-
ductible.7 We also assume that the gross production function F(K, L) and
the adjustment cost function H(K, i) are linear homogeneousin their ar-
guments so that F(K, L) can be written asLf(K/L) and H(K, i) as
Kc(I/K), with f', c' > 0, f" <0 and c" > 0. Underthese assumptions, it
is well known that the firm optimal plan satisfies:
=i(At
—1);i'()c'(.) > 0 (3)
where:
=E{HK( ) +(ñ t+vt+v) HK(3,
2 HK,1 <0 11K,2 > 0
tt3=1 v=1 t+jt+j
(4)
6See Devereax, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) for empirical evidence on this point.
However, Cummins, Hasset, Hubbard (1995) present a more upbeatevaluation of the
effects of taxation on investment.
71f investment expenditures are not tax deductable (1 —Tj)shouldnot multiply It. Most
countries, in reality, are somewhere in between these two extreme cases,with depreciations
allowances spread over time and with additional deductions for investment expenditures
allowed in the first year.
6=b(wt); '>O (5)
The marginal (net) product of capital, HK,is a function of the cap-
ital/labor ratio and of the investment rate,because HK =FK—HK=
f11(K/L)+(It/Kt)C'(1t/Kt)_C(It/Kt).Moreover, t+j=(1—)/(1+rt+);
t+j =(1—+)/(l—Tt+_i).
We will call13t the discount factor and Yt thecorporate taxfactor8.Note
that Aeciuals the shadow value of one additionalunit of capital in absence
oftaxation Adivided by (1 —Tt),(i.e.: A=A/(1—
Thus,the investment rate is a function of the (tax-adjusted)shadow value
of capital, which depends upon
the expected present discounted value of the
netmarginal product of capital, 11K(see equations (3) and (4)). ilKisa
decreasingfunction of the capital labor ratio, which is an increasingfunction
of the real wage rate through the first ordercondition for labor (see equations
(4) and (5)). Ceteris paribus, an
increase (current or expected) in the real
wagedecreases the shadow value of capital and, hence,investment. The fiscal
policy channel which we focus on isthe effect of public spending and taxes
on labor costs and therefore profits.
There are several ways to rationalize this "supply-side"link between fiscal
policy and investment. In a competitivelabor market increases in taxes on
laborincome leadto a decrease in the individual's labor supplyof hours
at each level of the gross wage, assumingthe substitution effect dominates.
Increases in taxes or unemployment benefitsalso affect participation decisions
and reduce total labor supply. Finally, an increasein public employment
increases total labor demand, and therefore putsupward pressure on the
equilibrium wage9. The opposite holdsfor reduction in taxes, unemployment
benefits or public employment.
In the context of unionized labor markets,similar effects hold.1° For
many specifications of theunion objective function and of the nature of the
wage bargain, an increasein income taxes or in social security contributions
thatreducesthe net wage of a worker leads to an increasein the pre-tax
real wage faced by the firm. Moreover, the spendingside of the government
budgetinfluences the reservation utilityof not being employed by a given
8We assume that the market rate of return risexogenous in the model. Our economy
can, thus, be considered a small open economy.
an analysis of the effect of public employment oninvestment in a real business
cycle model, see Finn (1998).
10See, for instance, Jackman, Layard and Nickell, (1991).
7firm in more than one way. First, public employment can be an alternative
to employment in the private sector. Thus, higher public wages and/or pub
lic employment increase the reservation utility of union members. Second,
unemployment compensation and various other transfer programs reduce the
costs of unemployment. Therefore, higher public spending (particularly on
government wages, transfers and welfare) increases the real wagedemanded
by the unions, thus reducing marginal profits and, hence, investment.
We can summarize in a simple way the effects of fiscal policy on the
equilibrium wage at each level of the aggregate capital stockKT.
wt=W(Kt,X); W,>O, W2>O (6)
where KT is the total capital stock equal to the capital stock of each
individual firm times the number of firms and XG is a vector of fiscal policy
variables, including labor taxes, unemployment benefits, the public sector
wage rate and public employment'1. In the perfectly competitivemodel KT
enters the wage schedule because it determines the position of the aggregate
demand for labor at a given wage rate. W in this case equates the demand
and supply of labor, which depends upon fiscal variables'2. Also in a union
model it is reasonable to assume that KTaffects positively the equilibrium
wage13.
If we assume perfect foresight, we can easily represent graphically the
effect of changes in the fiscal policy parameters on the capital stock through
Calmfors and Horn (1986) for a model of a centralized union that bargains both for
private and public sector workers and Holmund (1997) for a model with separate unions.
In the latter paper there can be wage differences between private and public wages in
equilibrium.
'2Using equation (5) total labor demand equals LT = whereLT =NLand
=NKand N denotes the number of firms. Note that we have assumed for simplicity
a labor supply that depends only upon the contemporaneous wage.
'3Under constant returns to scale, standard monopolistic union models imply that the
wage is independent of the capital stock of the individual firmfor any given level of
alternative income. However, in general equilibrium, it is possible to show that, under
reasonable assumptions, the alternative income to union members, and hence the union
wage, are increasing functions of the capital stock. Note that thesolution to the one period
union model is also the time consistent contract in a dynamic game in which the union
has an intertemporal utility function and acts as the Stackelberg leader facing a firm with
convex adjustment costs for capital (see Van der Ploeg (1988)). See also Devereux and
Lockwood (1991), Denny and Nickell (1993) on the determination of the capital stock in
union models.
8the wage channel. The two equations defining the steady state (from (2),
(3), (4) and (5)) are
i—1)=6 (7)
-f'((w)) -(A-1)i(A-1) + c(i(A -1))+ (1- )A =0 (8)
Equation (7) is the LK =0locus and it implies that in steady state
the aggregate capital stock is constant when A equals 1 + c' (6). Forvalues
of A greater (smaller) than 1 + c'(6) the investment rate exceeds (falls short)
the depreciation rate 8 and the capital stock grows (contracts). Equation (8)
defines the A+1 =0locus. Since the wage rate is an increasing function
of the capital stock KT (see (6)) and the marginal product of capital a
decreasing function of the wage, one can show that the A+1 =0locus is
downward sloping14. For values of A above (below) the locus, the shadow
value of capital increases (decreases). The LK =0and the =0
loci are represented in Figure 1. The steady state equilibrium is saddle-path
stable'5.
When there is an unanticipated permanent increase in public employ-
ment, public sector wage, unemployment benefits orlabor taxes at a given
level of the discount rate, the A+1 =0locus shifts downward and the
steady state capital stock decreases from K to K. Theinvestment rate
falls discretely below the depreciation rate, following the discretefall of A
(see move from point E0 to D), and then it recovers gradually.The effect of
anticipated changes in fiscal policy and of unanticipated temporary changes
can be similarly analyzed.
2.2 From theory to testing
In order to take the model to the data, we need to parametrize the adjust-
ment cost function and to select a proxy for the marginal profitabilityof
14 precisely, d)—f",b'WkT o
dKT(i-(+))
<
when zK1 =0and =0loci intercept.
'5Note that, given the discount rate, our assumption of full instantaneous deductability
of investment expenditure, yields the result that capital is neutral with respect tothe
corporate tax rate in the steady state. See Nickell (1978), chapter9.
9capital. Finally, we will have to choose how to model empirically the de-
pendence of marginal profitability on fiscal factors. We will assume that
adjustment costs are linear homogeneous and quadratic, i.e. H(K, I) =
[ (- — Et)K] where Et is a stochastic shock which is known when firms
decide their inputs16.We will experiment with two proxies for the gross-of-
tax marginal profit of capital, 11KV First, under the assumptions of perfect
competition and linear homogeneity we used so far, marginal profits equals
the marginal product of capital and can be approximated by average profits
per unit of capital.
More precisely,
IIK(Kt, I) =[F(K,L) —H(K,I) —wL]/K + HiO(It/Kt)(9)
[F(K, L) —H(K,I) —wtLt]/K itt
where itt denotes average operating profits. For brevity, we will refer to
this as the "benchmark case". Alternatively, if we assume that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas, and the firm is imperfectly competitive, marginal
profits can be shown to be approximately a multiple of the sales to capital
ratio S/K, i.e.: 11K = (S/K),where 0 equals the elasticity of output with
respect to capital times the markup of prices over marginalcosts17. If we use
average gross-of-tax profits to proxy for marginal gross-of-tax profits,and
linearize around sample means of it, i3t+.and weobtain:
+ +
1()3t+i+i] +,
(10)
where variables with a bar denote sample means. We have omitted additive
constants for ease of notation and we have used the approximations I3t+j
1—r+
—and 1—('rt+
—Tt+_i)/(1
—r). Thus,the optimal rate
of investment depends on the present discounted value of future cash flow,
of the discount factor, and of the corporate tax factor18.
'61n the empirical analysis, we allow for different alternative assumptions about the
nature of the error term. In particular, we allow it either to have an AR(l) structure or
to be a random walk. Blundell et al. (1992) find evidence of an AR(1) structure for
using panel data.
'7See also Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).
'81f gross-of-tax profits are proxied instead by the sales to capital ratio, equation (10)
10A particularly simple and illuminating case iswhen in equation (10) 3t+j
and areconstant over time, with the latter set equal to one (implying
no changes in corporate taxes).In this case, the optimal rate of investment
is:
+Et (11)
K
Finally, we must specify an estimable systemlinking government spend-
ing, taxes and profits. Our strategyis to use the estimates of this system
to construct a series for ), which we then useto estimate equation (10)19.
Starting with the simplest case in which isconstant and isset equal
to one, we use the following profit equation:
=a1iv_+ a2ivt_2+a3Gt + a4Rt + Ut (12)
where C and R are public spending and revenue (orspending and revenue
components) as a share of trend GDP and IVisgross/net-of-tax profits or
value added in the business sector as a shareof the capital stock. Gross-
of-tax profits are defined as value added in thebusiness sector minus labor
costs. On the basis of the previous discussion, wewould expect both a3 and
a4 to be negative. Theevolution of revenue and expenditure is described by
a simple VAR system:
R =d11R_1+ d12R_2 + d13G_1 + d14C_2 + (13a)
=d21R_1+ d22R_2 + d23G_1 + d24G_2 + Wt (13b)
In estimation G, and R are cyclically adjusted toeliminate the automatic
changes in the variable induced bybusiness cycle fluctuations.
However, there could be a second sourceof endogeneity between profits
on one hand, and revenues and expenditures onthe other: the discretionary
would still be valid, with 9treplacingitt.Ifinvestment expenditures are not tax de-
ductable (10) becomes
+ +
where=(
—r)itt.f denotesaverage profits net of taxes.
'9The q theory of investment has not been always empiricallysuccessful. Our emphasis
here, however, is not on a test of q theory versusalternatives. We are interested in
emphasiszing a link between profits and investmentand below we also allow for liquidity
effects. For an excellent discussion of the "state ofthe art" of investment theory and
empirics, see Caballero (1999).
11response of the policymakers tobusiness cycle fluctuations. We do not have
any quantitative estimateof this channel of endogeneity, but we believe that,
due to the "long and variable" decision lagsin fiscal policy, this source of
endogeneity is unlikely to be too serious.The budget for year t is usually
discussed and approved during the second halfof year t —1.Some additional
fiscal policy measures are sometimes decided duringthe year, but they usually
represent a small fraction of the budget,and most of the times they become
effective only by the end of the year. Thus, ourassumption that cyclically
adjusted Ct and R do not depend oncurrent profits (or GDP) is likely to
be a reasonable, although imperfect, approximationto reality.
For the same reasons, we assume that Gand R are known at the be-
ginning of the period. By contrast, wewill initially assume that itt is not
in the information set at time t: thus, thefirst term in the infinite sum that
enters the construction of ) in equation (10)is the expected value of itt
conditional on the values of the variables on the righthand side of (12). We
will routinely check that our estimates of theinvestment equation are not
unduly sensitive to this assumption. That is, wewill also allow for the case
of itt in the information set at time t, so thatthe actual value of itt can be
used in constructing )20
For the more general model with variablediscount and corporate tax
factors, in section 5 we will augmentthe system of forecasting equations in
(12) and (13) with:
rt =b1rt_1+ b2r_2 + b3G + b4R + Vt (14)
Moreover, we augment the VAR for Cand R with the corporate tax rate
Tt.Finally,we will experiment with adding an outputvariable to the profit
function and hence to the system of equations generatingexpectations.
3Data
Allour data are from the OECD 1997Economic Outlook Database. Our
sample includes 18 countries: Australia, Austria,Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
20Note that, although and Wt are uncorrelated with Ut, theyneed not be uncorrelated
with each other. As long as (12) is used to forecast future profitsand therefore to construct
thisis not a problem. We will have to take up this issue againwhen we study the
impulse responses of investment to spending or revenueshocks.
12Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, covering a maxi-
mum time span from 1960 to 199621. The data appendix contains the precise
definition of all the variables we use and some descriptive statistics.
Each component of revenues —directtaxes on households, business taxes,
indirect taxes, and social security contributions —iscyclically adjusted by
computing the value of the component if GDP were at its trend level instead
than at its actual level, using the GDP elasticities provided by the OECD. We
calculate trend GDP separately for each country in the sample, by regressing
log GDP in real terms on a constant and a quadratic trend22. Hence, for
each component of revenues we compute:
RA =R(GDPVTR/GDPV)' (15)
where RA is the cyclically adjusted revenue item, RCA is the actual rev-
enue item, GDPVTR is trend real GDP, GDPV is real GDP, and a2 is the
elasticity of the revenue item i to real GDP. A similar adjustment is applied
to total primary spending and transfers23. We then divide each cyclically
adjusted revenue component and each spending component by trend GDP.
Investment and profits are divided by the capital stock to obtain the invest-
ment and profit rates.
Unit root tests run country by country on all the variables used in the
equations did not allow us to reject the presence of a unit root for all the
countries. However, given the low power of the Phillips-Perron test in small
sample, we also implemented the unit root test proposed by Tm, Pesaran and
Shin (1995) on the panel. This time, the evidence was in favor of station-
arity24. We first estimate our model in levels, detrending all the variables,
21Two small OECD countries, Luxembourg and Iceland, are excluded, together with
the new members of this group admitted oniy recently. New Zealand, Portugal, and
Switzerland are excluded because of data problems.
22Thus, we apply the same cyclical adjustment as the OECD, except that we use trend
GDP as the reference value of output, rather than 'potential output' as calculated by the
OECD. See OECD, Fiscal Position and Business Cycles, Users' Guide for Statistzcs on
diskette, for the values of the tax elasticities. We also used the Hodrick-Prescott filter to
estimate trend GDP, obtaining similar results.
23The OECD does not provide the values of the transfers elasticities. We used the
elasticities provided for total primary spending and scaled them up by the ratio of transfers
to total primary spending. This is under the reasonable assumption that transfers are the
only cyclically sensitive component of government spending.
24Note that, by dividing revenues and spending by trend GDP, we implicitly assume
that GDP is trend stationary. It is still possible that the ratio between revenues and
spending and trend GDP contains a unit root if the numerators contain a unit root.
13allowing for country specific linear and quadratic trends25. In section 5 we
present results of an estimation in first differences and we experimentwith
allowing country specific constants to account for country specific drifts. Our
basic results on fiscal policy and investment are unaffected; in fact, in several
respects they are stronger for the model in differences.
4 Empirical results
We consider first the simplest case defined by (11), (12) and (13) above, in
which investment depends only upon future expected marginal profits and
the discount factors and corporate tax factors are constant.26
4.1 The effects of fiscal policy on profits
We begin, in Table 1, by estimating the profit equation (12). Columns 1-3
of this table correspond to different definitions of the dependent variable.
Marginal profit 11K is proxied by average profit gross of corporate tax pay-
ments ic in column 1, by average profit net of taxes lr* in column 2, and by
the sales-to-capital ratio S/K in column 3.
In all three columns, both primary spending and revenues as a share
of trend GDP have a negative and statistically significant effect on marginal
profits, and their coefficients are quite similar across the three columns. Using
a coefficient of 0.10 which is roughly the average across the columns in Table
1, an increase in government spending by 1 percentage point of trend GDP
decreases profits as a share of the capital stock by about 1/10 of a percentage
point, and an increase in taxes by the same amount has roughly the same
effect on profits. At a first look, these effects may not seem very large.
However, many episodes of fiscal adjustments in recent years have been quite
sizable. For instance, in Ireland 1986-1989, primary spending as share of
GDP decreased from 37.9 per cent in 1986 to 29.7 per cent in 1989 and, in
the same years, taxes were cut by almost 2.5 percentage points from 37.6 to
35.25. Using the coefficient in Table 1, this change in fiscal policy accounts for
250LS estimation in levels with country specific effects is appropriate since we have a
panel with large T.
26J this case, we assume the corporate tax factor 'y =1,and the discount factor
/3 =1—6—r = 0.88,where 6 =0.1and r= 0.02,the average value in our sample.
14a ceteris panbusincrease in profits as a share of GDP of almost 2 percentage
points27.
We now consider the effects of the individual budget items.Since the re-
suits are very similar across the three columns of Table 1, inthe next tables
we present our regressions using the average profitrate gross of corporate
tax payments (as in columns 1 of Table 1) as our proxyfor marginal profits.
On the spending side of the budget (Table 2) we consider transfers,the wage
and non-wage components of government consumption, and governmentin-
vestment. On the revenue side of the budget (Table 3), weconsider in turn
labor taxes (defined as the sum of direct taxes on households,and social
security and payroll taxes), taxes on business, andindirect taxes.
The point estimates of the coefficients of all spending items are negative
and significant at the 5% level, except non-wage government consumption,
which is significant at the 10% level. The government wagebill has the
strongest negative effect on profits, with acoefficient of -.43 and a t-statistic
of 6.33. Thus, a permanent fall in wage government consumption by1 percent
of GDP would lead to a cetenis panibus increase in profits as ashare of the
capital stock by .42 percentage points and an increasein profits as a share
of GDP by .82 percentage points on impact and of 2.74 percentage pointsin
the steady state.
Among the revenue items, labor taxes have the strongest negativeeffect
on profits, with a coefficient of -.16 and at-statistics of 4.25. An increase in
labor taxes by 1 percent of trend GDP would lead to a reductionin profits
as a share of GDP by about .30 percentage points onimpact and .98 in
the steady state. These results are consistent with the labormarket models
discussed above, since the two components of spending and revenueswhich
seems to affect profits more are government wagesand labor taxation.
4.2 The investment equation
Table 4 displays estimates of the investment equation (11). FollowingAbel
and Blanchard (1986), and Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993), weadd
some dynamic to our equation by lettingthe first lag of ).alsoaffect in-
vestment. Moreover, we estimate the equation by GLS to accountfor the
presence of a AR(1) error term,with an autocorrelation coefficient that is
27Weconvertthe profits/capital ratio into the profits/GDP ratio using the average
capital/GDP ratio of 1.89 for the whole sample.
15allowed to vary across countries.
Columns 1-3 parallel the corresponding columnsof Table 1. Thus, marginal
profits are proxied by gross-of-tax average profitsin column 1, by net-of-tax
average profits in colunm 2,and by the sales to capital ratio in column 3.
Column 4 is exactly like column 1, except that we computeAassumingthat
current profits are known at the beginningof the period, rather than with
one period delay28.
Contemporaneous A is a significant explanatoryvariable for investment
in all columns of Table 4, and the one period laggedvalue is statistically
significant in column 4. The pointestimates of the coefficient of contempo-
raneous Avarybetween .05 and .1, and are similar to those implied bythe
estimates in Blanchard, Summers and Rhee (1993)for the United States29.
28 implies that the actual value of itt is used toconstruct A. Formally, omitting
constants, if profits are known with one period delay,A is calculated as
=a'(I
—Ap)AXt
where:
a'= [100000]
X =[itt_iGRt—2 G_j Re_i]'
X, =AX_1+ Et,
Ifcurrent profits are known at the beginning of the period
A =itt+ pa'(I —Bp)'BXt
where:
X= [ G Ritt_i G_1 Rt_iI', X =BX_1+ t
and A and B are the matrices implied by equations (12and 13).
29Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) adopt a different specification,in that they
regress the first difference ofthe logarithm of the investment to capital ratio on thefirst
difference of the logarithm of A and its first lag, obtaining acoefficient on the contempo-
raneous A of .91 in the full sample and of .54in the post-war sample. Using an average
value for A of 1, and an average value of the investmentto capital ratio of about 6% in
the whole period and 8% in the post-war period, an increaseof A by 1% would lead to an
increase in investment as a share of capital by .55 percentagepoints in the whole period
and by .43 percentage points in the post-war period. Summingthe coefficients of contem-
poraneous and lagged A, the effectwould be .94 percentage points in the whole period
and .83 percentage points in the post-war period. These are veryclose to the effect of 1
percentage points that we obtain from ourestimate in column 1 of Table 4 (note that the
coefficient of the first lag of A is minuscule).
164.3 Fiscal policy, profits and investment
We now provide some quantitative estimates of the dynamic effectsof fiscal
policy on investment. We discuss two types of experiments.The first is meant
to give a rough idea of the order of magnitude of the effects oninvestment.
Suppose primary government spending falls permanently by1 percent of
trend GDP: what is the effect on investment? We abstract from the equations
for taxes and spending (13a and 13b) and we treat them as if they were set
by the government independently of their own (orother variables') past.
This back-of-the envelope calculation gives an approximate answer. Starting
from the profit equation in column 1 of Table 1, a permanent fall inC by 1
percent of trend GDP causes a permanent fall in profits asshare of capital
by .09/(1-.67-.03).3 percentage points; using a value of 3 of .88, this leads
to a change in A by .3/(1-.88) =2.5percent. Using the estimate of column
1 in Table 4, investment increases by .27 percentage points as a shareof the
capital stock, and by .55 percentage points as a shareof GDP30. This is far
from a trivial effect.
The second and more precise experiment consists of tracing out the dy-
namic effects of a unit shock to spending or revenues, using the estimatesof
the whole system (equations (12) and (13)). Formally, we study the impulse
responses of investment to a shock to spending or revenues.
In order to do this, we need to solve a preliminary question.3' To obtain
a meaningful impulse response from the dynamic system ((12)and (13)),
we need innovations that are mutually orthogonal.While the reduced form
innovationsand Wtarecertainly orthogonal to Ut,ingeneral they will be
correlated with each other. This means that a shock to, say Wtisnot really
a "spending shock", but a linear combinationof the underlying structural
spending and revenue shocks. We are skeptical aboutthe possibility of re-
covering the structural, orthogonal shocks to revenues and spending.Thus,
we orthogonalize the innovations in two ways: first, by letting revenues"come
30Note that here and in what follows, we use the fact that
dld(I/K) K
dxdx i—(I/K)
since K is the end of the period capital stock. Dividing by GDP we obtain the change
of investment as a percentage of GDP. We set I/K to 0.07 and K/Y to 1.89, the average
sample values.
31See Blanchard and Perotti (1999) for a more thorough treatment of this issue.
17first", i.e. by adding R to the rhs of equation (13b);alternatively, by letting
spending "come first", i.e. by adding G,to the rhs of equation (13a). Both
procedures give orthogonalized spendingand revenue shocks by construction;
if the correlation between the reduced forminnovationsand Wt is small,
then the impulse responses to the two orthogonalizedspending shocks ob-
tained with these two procedures will not differmuch. In fact, in our sample
the correlation between Wt and rjisindeed low, .13. As an example, we will
present the results obtained when revenuescome first32.
Table 5 displays the changes in investment expressed as ashare of GDP,
due to a unitary shock at time t, to primary spending, revenues,and their
main components, on impact and up to 5 years,and the cumulative change
after the first five, ten and twenty years33. For instance, areduction by one
percentage point in the ratio of primary spendingto GDP leads to an increase
in the investment/GDP ratio by .16 percentage pointson impact, and to
a cumulative increase by .50 percentage pointsafter two years and by .80
percentage points after five years.The effect is also statistically significant34.
Increases in taxes reduce investment but the magnitudeof the tax effects
is smaller and statistically significant only on impact.For instance, the
cumulative effect on the investment/GDP ratiois -.18 percentage points,
compared with -.80for spending.
The results on the component of spending arealso quite instructive. Con-
sistently with our results on profits, the largesteffect is from government
wages. For instance, in responseto a cut in the public wage bill by one per
cent of GDP, the impact effect is an increasein the investment/GDP ratio
by .51 percentage points; the cumulativeeffect at the end of the fifth year is
2.77 percentage points. For this reason, if the cutin primary spending were
concentrate all or' government wages, the magnitudeof the effects on invest-
ment would be much larger than those computedabove. Labor taxes also
have a sizable effect on private investment.An increase of labor taxes by one
percent of GDP leads to a fall inthe investment/GDP ratio by .17 percent-
age points on impactand by .75 percentage points in the steady state.The
effect of a shock to taxes on labor is significant atthe 10% level on impact
32We also checked (and confirmed) that our results are not undulysensitive to the
orthogonalization procedure.
33j other words, the table displays the impulse responses ofthe investment to GDP
ratio at different horizons.
34Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping, based on500 replications. We fol-
lowed Runkle (1987). See footnote to Table 5 for details.
18and after one year.
5 Sensitivity and robustness
Our results are robust to a variety of different specifications. In what follows,
we discuss several extensions to our benchmark regressions. We add each
extension, one by one, to the benchmark case.
5.1 The profit function
5.1.1 Adding GDP
In Table 6 we augment our basic profit regression with a measure of "private
GDP", namely the ratio of total GDP less government consumption divided
by the capital stock. This measure of the volume of sales per unit of capital
is strongly positively associated with the profit rate. This result holds both
in OLS and IV regressions, where the instruments are appropriately lagged
values of the included variables (see list at the bottom of the table).
Our results on the effects of fiscal policy on profits are virtually un-
changed. If we use this augmented regression of profits to construct ), our
results on investments are also virtually unchanged. The dynamic response
of investment to fiscal policy changes is also very close to the one in Table
5. Consider, for example, augmenting the VAR described by equations (12)
with an equation for "private GDP" and adding its lagged value to the profit
equation. A reduction by one percentage point in spending as a share of
GDP reduces the investment/GDP ratio by .17 percentage points on impact,
and by .61 after five years. In the benchmark model in Table 5 these values
are 0.16 and 0.80, respectively.
5.1.2 Fiscal policy, labor costs and profits
One important fiscal channel which we emphasize is the effect of public wages
and employment on labor costs in the private sector. A different test of this
channel is to regress profits on real private labor cost instrumented by the
government wage bill. This is done in Table 7. The first four columns of
this table use as instruments for private labor costs various combinations of
variables, always including public wage spending. The results are supportive
of our hypothesis and are very robust, (the coefficient of private labor costs is
19always negative and significant). They hold with and without private GDP
as a share of capital in the profit regression (as shown in the table) and for
several alternative sets of instruments.
The next four columns use total government spending and/or total rev-
enues rather than public wage spending and/or labor taxes as instruments.
V,,That is interesting is that the coefficient of instrumented wage is lower in
absolute value than in the previous four columns. The first stage regressions,
where the private wages are regressed on alternative sets of instruments, are
quite illuminating. In fact, Table 8 shows that private wages increase with
taxes and public spending. Moreover, private wages are better explained by
public wages rather than by total government spending. Consistently with
our discussion in section 2.2, while total revenues do not have a positive and
statistically significative effect on private wages, labor taxes do. Finally, our
results for the investment regression are virtually unchanged when we use
these alternative formulations for the profit function.
5.2 First differences
We have re-estimated all our regressions with variables in first differences
rather than in levels. In fact, as discussed above, unit root tests country by
country and on the whole panel lead to opposite conclusions about the order
of integration of the series.
Tables 9 and 10 display the results. In the profit equation (first panel of
Table 9), the coefficient of primary spending is twice and that of revenues is
three times as large as the corresponding coefficients in the regression in levels
(column 1 of Table 1). However, in the investment equation (second panel of
Table 9), the coefficient of contemporaneous A is about one tenth compared
to the one for the model in levels of Table 4. Combining these results,
Table 10 reports the effects, at different horizons, on the investment/GDP
ratio of a unitary shock to primary spending and revenues, using the same
orthogonalization adopted in Table 5. The impulse response to a shock in
spending in the first five years is similar to the one obtained for the model
in levels. The cumulative effect after the first ten years is 1.49 percentage
points for the model in difference and .98 for the model in levels. In the
case of a shock to taxes, the difference with the regressions in levels is more
marked. For instance, after five years, the cumulative effect on investment is
almost five times as large in the model in differences compared to the model
in levels (-0.87 versus -.16). Moreover, it is of the same order of magnitude
20as the effect of a shock in spending. Therefore, the conclusions concerning
the quantitative effects of fiscal policy and in particular of taxation would be
reinforced if we rely on the model in differences. However, the more powerful
tests of the unit root on the panel tend to support the specification in levels.
5.3 Variable discount and corporate tax factors
So far, we have assumed that the firm's discount factor fl and the corporate
tax rate factor 'y were constant. We now allow these two terms to vary
over time; thus, the investment equation we estimate is now (10) instead of
(11), and we add equation (14) and the equation for the corporate tax rate
to the VAR (13). This allows us to investigate the effects of changes in the
interest rate on investment. Table 11 reports the corresponding regressions,
estimated in the benchmark case of variables in levels and with marginal
profits proxied by average profits gross of taxes. To compute the discount
factor I3,we use the one-period (net of corporate taxes) ex post real interest
rate to measure the term rt ,anda value of 0.10 for the depreciation rate
Column 1 displays the estimate of equation (14) for the real interest rate,
and column 2 of the investment equation (10). In the interest rate equation,
the coefficient of R (i.e. tax revenues) is positive and significant, while the one
on C (i.e. government spending) is negative and significant. These results
are somewhat counterintuitive. However, other authors have also obtained
similarly results. For instance, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) in a panel
study on OECD countries on the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates find
that government deficit is negatively associated with the interest rates in
many specifications.
In the investment equation, Aprof measures the contribution to changes
in ) due to changes in average profits, ,\rint captures, instead, changes due
to the net real rate of interest and Actax changes due to the corporate tax
rate (given the net of taxes interest rate). Thus, these terms correspond to
the first, second, and third terms on the rhs of equation (10), respectively.
As expected the interest rate term has a negative and statistically significant
coefficient in the investment equation, while changes in the corporate tax
rate term do not have any statistically significant effect on investments.
Turning to the impulse responses (not shown), the reaction of investment
35Results would be very similar if we used the ex-post real interest rate gross of taxes.
21to a shock in spending is slightly smaller than in the benchmark case. A
positive shock to spending reduces investment through its effects on profits,
but it also has a negative effect on the real interest rate, thus increasing
investment. After the first five years, the cumulative effect on investment as
a share of GDP due to a unitary shock in spending is -.73, against -.80 in
the benchmark case. By contrast, a shock to revenues has a stronger effect
on investment than in the benchmark case. An increase in taxes reduces
investment both through its effect on profits and via the real rate of interest;
after the first five years, cumulatively, investment as a share of GDP decreases
by .3 percentage points, almost twice as much as in the benchmark model.
5.4 Time effects
We added year dummies in the regressions as an additional way of controlling
for common shocks to all countries in the sample. Tables 12 and 13 display
the profit regressions thus obtained, as usual with the average profit gross of
corporate tax as a proxy for marginal profits. In Table 12 the independent
fiscal policy variables are primary spending and total revenues (column 1),
or primary spending and the individual revenue items (columns 2 to 4). In
Table 13, the independent fiscal policy variables are total revenues and the
individual expenditure items. The estimated coefficients on public spending
are lower than those in the benchmark case and in one case (when labor taxes
are used as the tax variable) the coefficient becomes insignificant. The coef-
ficients on the revenue items are unchanged. In Table 13, the coefficients of
transfers and non-wage government consumption are now insignificant, but
the coefficient of wage government consumption and of government invest-
ment are still large and significant. As argued above, taxes on households,
social security taxes, and wage government consumption are the items of the
budget with the strongest impact on unit labor costs and firms' profitability.
5.5 Country by country results
We have re-estimated the profit and investment equations by dropping one
country at a time: none of the resulting 18 regressions for each equation were
significantly different from the regressions we present in the paper.
We have also estimated the profit and investment equations country by
country. Given the relatively short time series available in each country,
results have to be taken with caution. In any case, the basic picture is
22encouraging. In the level regression, the effect of government spending on
profits is negative and significant at the 5 per cent level in 10 out of 18 coun-
tries; of the remaining 8 countries, government spending has a negative, but
insignificant coefficient in 4 countries. No country has a significant positive
coefficient. The results on taxes in the profit equation are slightly less strong.
In six countries, the coefficient of revenues is negative and significant (at the
5% level in three countries, at the 10% level in the other three); in seven,
it is negative but insignificant; in no country the coefficient is positive and
significant.
In the investment equation, in ten countries, contemporaneous and/or
lagged values of ) are statistically significant determinants of investment.
In seven countries, however, neither contemporaneous nor lagged values of
are significant, and in one country the coefficient on X is positive and
insignificant, but the coefficient on lagged ).isnegative and significant at the
10% level.
We then re-estimated the profit and investment equations country by
country in first differences, and the results are similar to those from the
regressions in levels, in fact, slightly stronger.
5.6 Expectations of profits, financial constraints and
investment
Our specification for ).includesall the discounted stream of expected future
marginal profits. There are two reasons why the future may not matter so
much. One is financial constraints; some firms may be limited in their access
to credit markets. The other one is that beyond one or two years forecasts
of future marginal profits and of fiscal policy become so unreliable that are
basically not used by the firm36. The focus of the present paper is not the
role of financial constraints (nor the "optimal" time horizon firms use for
investment decisions) and aggregate data are not appropriate to address this
issue as it deserves. However, the existence of financial constraints would be
relevant for our purposes for two reasons. At the theoretical level, it would
reinforce the negative effects of fiscal policy on investment to the extent
that changes in taxes or spending affect the firms' cash flow. Empirically,
it is important to assess whether our constructed ).inreality capture firms'
36This is, of course, equivalent to discounting the future beyond, say (t+1), at a much
higher rate.
23availability of internal funds, rather than expected returns to investments.
Columns 1-2 of Table 14 investigate the presence of financial constraints
by applying a standard methodology in the empirical investment literature.
We add the contemporaneous (column 1) or lagged value (column 2) of the
profit rate net of corporate tax payments to our benchmark investment equa-
tion. When we use current profits as our proxy for financial constraints, we
tackle endogeneity by using as instruments the current value and first lag of
the fiscal policy variables, of A, and of the profit rate. In column (1) the
coefficient on profits is negative but statistically insignificant and the coeffi-
cients on A and A (—1) are virtually unchanged from the estimates in Table 4.
In column (2), the coefficient on lagged profits is 0.07 and significant at the
10% level, consistent with a liquidity effect at work. At the same time, the
coefficient of the contemporaneous value of A falls, relative to the estimates
in Table 4, by 30%, and the one on lagged A by 50%. The overall effect of
a shock to fiscal policy on investment is, however, stronger than in Table 4.
Accounting for financial constraints, investment as a share of GDP increases
approximately by 0.73 percentage points (versus 0.55 in the benchmark case)
in response to permanent decrease in primary spending by 1 percent of trend
GDP.
Columns 3-5 of Table 14 check whether forecasts of future marginal prof-
its beyond one or two years are indeed relevant for investment decisions.
We construct A including just expected marginal profits at time t (column
3), t and t+1 (column 4), t, t+1 and t+2 (column 5), rather than all the
discounted stream of expected future marginal profits. In colunm 3, the
magnitude of the coefficient on A is three times as big as the one in Table
4. When we extend the forecast horizon used to construct A (column 5),
the magnitude of the coefficient declines and it is approximately equal to the
benchmark case.
Finally, in column 6 (column 7) expected marginal profits at time t and
all the discounted stream of expected future marginal profits (the discounted
stream of expected future marginal profits at time t+1 and t+2) enter as sep-
arate regressors in the investment equation. Only the coefficient of expected
marginal profits at time t has a statistically significant effect on investment
and its magnitude is more than twice that in the benchmark model in Ta-
ble 4. We also compute the dynamic response of investment to fiscal policy
changes considering the different specifications in column 3-8. Results are
very close to the one in Table 5. In some specifications, changes in public
spending and total revenue have slightly lower effects on investment. In con-
24clusion, we find that investment is affected mostly by expected profits for
near future. This might be an indication that expectations of profits too
far into the future are too unreliable to be used in computing the present
discounted value of stream of marginal profits. Although interesting, this
finding does not alter our conclusions on the importance of fiscal policy as a
determinant of investment decision of firms.
6 Large fiscal adjustments
In this section we discuss whether the fiscal effects which we estimated above
are enough to explain the behavior of the economy around the time of large
fiscal adjustments. The literature on large fiscal adjustments has highlighted
an important empirical regularity. Fiscal adjustments which rely mostly, or
exclusively, on spending cuts, and particularly on transfers and government
wages, are associated with a surge in growth during and immediately after
the adjustment. The opposite occurs in the case of adjustments which are
tax based37.While most of the literature has focused on consumption, Table
15 shows that in fact, business investment displays a very large amount of
variability around fiscal adjustments. This table shows the surge in invest-
ment during expansionary fiscal adjustments —i.e.those large reductions in
the deficit that are associated with an increase in growth —andthe collapse
of investment during the contractionary adjustments38. On average, busi-
ness investment growth rate is -0.36% in the two years before expansionary
fiscal adjustments and it jumps to 5.24% in the two years after the adjust-
ment. In the contractionary episodes, these numbers are respectively 4.59%
and 0.29%. In the two years before the expansionary adjustments, on av-
erage business investment contributes negatively to the (moderate) increase
in GDP growth, while private consumption is responsible for approximately
half of that increase39. After the adjustment, the average contribution from
business investment to the (large) change in GDP growth jumps by almost 24
37See for example Alesina, Perotti and Taveres (1998) and the related literature cited
therein.
38The precise definition of expansionary and contractionary fiscal adjustments is given
at the bottom of Table 15.
39The contribution to GDP growth from each component of aggregate demand weights
its growth rate with the share of each component relative to GDP. This quantity is then
expressed as a proportion of the GDP growth rate. See the notes to Table 15 for details.
25percentage points, from -6.55% to 17.17%, while the contribution from pri-
vate consumption shows just a slightly increase from 51.37% to 51.82%. The
opposite happens in the contractionary episodes: the contribution to GDP
growth by business investment decrease about 15% while the one of private
consumption is stable. The downturn which accompanies "contractionary"
fiscal adjustments is therefore largely explained by the fall in private business
investments. It is also interesting to note how the share of net exports actu-
ally falls drastically during expansionary adjustments and increases during
contractionary ones. This is evidence against the view that expansionary
adjustments are mainly driven by devaluations. In summary, this evidence
suggests that private business investment is a critical component of domestic
demand in terms of response to fiscal shocks.
In Table 16 we use our estimated model to see how well we "match" the
behavior of investment around the episodes of fiscal adjustments described
in the previous table. We simply use the fitted value for the investment rate
(I/K) together with actual GDP and capital stock figures to calculate the
"predicted" growth rate of business investment and the "predicted" invest-
ment to GDP ratio for each country. We then average across episodes to
make our results comparable with those in Table 15.
We present two models, the benchmark and one with GDP in the profit
function and a variable interest rate in the investment equation. Both of
them, particularly the latter, do quite well at matching the actual data, par-
ticularly in terms of comparison between the immediate aftermath of the
fiscal adjustment and the "base" (i.e. immediately before). For instance,
with the richer model we predict a difference in the average rate of growth
of investment before and after "expansionary" fiscal adjustment of 4.13 com-
pared to 5.60 in the data, and of -4.68 against -4.30 in the case of "contrac-
tionary" fiscal adjustments. In some cases the model predicts the "jumps"
of the investment share with one year delay relative to the actual data. A
more thorough analysis of this timing issue would require quarterly data on
fiscal variables, which are not available for many OECD countries.40
Finally, we investigated whether the behavior of profits and investment is
structurally different following large changes in the fiscal policy stance. We
pursued this investigation in a variety of ways. First we checked whether a
quadratic term on spending and taxes was significant in the profit equation;
it was not. Second, we checked for structural breaks in the profit equation,
40See Blanchard and Perotti (1998) for a paper using quarterly fiscal data on the US.
26in the form of significant breaks in the constant or in the coefficients of
spending and taxes in the profit equations. We also explored the possibility
of structural breaks in the investment equations. In both cases, we did not
find any evidence of structural breaks.
In summary, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the effect
of fiscal policy (and its components) on investment is not different in "nor-
mal" times and around major fiscal adjustments. Since much of the effects of
the latter on the economy go through investments, this evidence casts doubts
on the need of developing special theories on the effects of large adjustments.
Finally, we have also performed the analogous experiments on episodes
of loose fiscal policies. Our results (available upon request) are very similar,
(with the opposite sign) to those obtained for fiscal adjustments.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that in OECD countries changes in fiscal policy have im-
portant effects on private business investment. Interestingly, the strongest
effects arise from changes in primary government spending and, especially,
government wages. We provide evidence consistent with a labor market chan-
nel through which fiscal policy influences labor costs, profits, investment and,
as a consequence, growth. Increases in public wages and/or employment and
transfers increase wage pressure in the private sector, both in unionized and
competitive labor markets. Also, workers in the private sector may react to
tax hikes by asking for higher pre-tax real wages (or decreasing labor supply),
once again putting pressures on profits and investment.
These effects on investment go a long way toward explaining those episodes
of expansionary fiscal contractions that have recently attracted considerable
attention. According to our results, the surge in private investment that ac-
companies the large spending cuts during these episodes is exactly what one
should expect. In fact, we found very little evidence, if any at all, that pri-
vate investment reacts differently during these large fiscal adjustments than
in "normal" circumstances.
The driving channel of our results is the effect of fiscal policy changes on
current and future expected profits. This suggests that two issues deserve
further examination. One is a more thorough examination on the effects
of fiscal policy on interest rates. Even though we allowed for interest rate
movements, there is certainly still room for further investigation of the effect
27of changes (especially large ones) of the fiscal stance on interest rates. This
investigation may shed additional light on the role of "credibility effects"
of fiscal adjustments on interest rates. The second issue is the change in
income distribution which follows large changes in the fiscal stance, and par-
ticularly, fiscal adjustments of various types. While there is ample evidence
that spending cuts can be expansionary, our evidence on profits may imply
that spending cuts may increase income inequality. Whether this is the case
or not is an important topic for future research.
288 Data Appendix
Variables' definitions
I/K: Business investment as a share of capital stock
ir: Profits gross of corporate tax payments as a share of capital stock Profits
are value added in business sector minus labor costs in the business sector.
lt*: Profits net of corporate tax payments as a share of capital stock Profits
are value added in business sector minus labor costs in the business sector.
S/K: Sales in the business sector as a share of the capital stock
Labor Costs in the business sector: Labor compensation rate in the busi-
ness sector times total employment of the business sector. The number of the
unpaid family workers are deducted from total employment of the business
sector because their output is not measured. We followed Blanchard (1997)
in doing this adjustment. When the number of unpaid family workers is not
available from the beginning of the sample, for each country, we assume that
the ratio of unpaid family workers to total employment is equal to the one
in the first year for which the data are available.
WP: log of real labor compensation rate in the business sector. Labor com-
pensation rate in the business sector (variable WSSE in the OECD database)
includes total social security payments.
r: Short term nominal interest rate net of corporate tax minus one period
ahead (ex-post) inflation, calculated using GDP deflator
C: Primary spending (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP. Primary
spending =TRAN+ GW + CNW + GINV + subsidies + other net cap-
ital outlays
R: Total revenues (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP. Total rev-
enues =TLAB+ TBUS + TIND +other transfers received by gov
TRAN: Transfers (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP
GW: wage component of current government spending on goods and ser-
vices, as a share of trend GDP
CNW: non wage component of current government spending on goods and
services, as a share of trend GDP
CINV: Government investment as a share of trend GDP
TLAB: Labor taxes (direct taxes on households + social security and payroll
taxes, cyclically adjusted), as a share of trend GDP
TB US: Direct taxes on business (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend
29GDP
TIND: Indirect taxes (cyclically adjusted) as a share of trend GDP
Summary statistics
Nobs. mean st. dev.
I/K 6350.070.03
II 6060.150.12
fl* 6010.14 0.11
S/K 6240.42 0.22
r 4650.02 0.04
C 6530.37 0.09
R 6280.36 0.09
TRAN 6610.14 0.06
GW 6530.11 0.03
CNW 6530.05 0.02
CINV 6580.03 0.01
TLAB 6450.20 0.07
TIND 6610.13 0.03
TBUS 6400.030.01
Source: OECD.
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34</ref_section>Table 1: Profits: benchmark regressions.
(1) (2) (3)
IIK(—1)
HK(—2)
R
G
0.67 0.64 0.77
(17.45)(16.54) (21.17)
0.03 0.04 0.005
(0.94)(1.49)(0.18)
-0.09-0.14-0.11
(-3.05)(-4.73)(-2.67)
-0.09-0.08-0.11
(-4.31)(-3.72)(-3.35) 2
Nobs
0.56 0.55 0.71
555 555 565
Dependent variable: marginal profit ilK.
Marginal profit proxied by average profit
gross of corporate taxes as a share of the
capital stock (7r) in column 1, by average
profit net of the corporate tax rate as a
share of the capital stock (ir*) in cohmrn
2, by sales to capital ratio (S/K) in col-
umn 3. Variables are in levels, and de-
trended allowing for couiitry specific lin-
ear and quadratic term. Revenues (R)
and primary spending (G) are cyclically
adjusted and in share of trend GDP. T-
statistics in parenthesis.
35Table 2: Profits: spending components.
__________(1) (2) (3) (4)
HK(—1) 0.69 0.66 0.71 0.70
(17.41)(17.27) (18.29) (18.11)
HK(—2) 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.50)(1.48)(0.43)(0.55)
R -0.10-0.10-0.10-0.12
(-3.19)(-3.27)(-3.43)(-3.90)
TRAN -0.11
(-2.45)
GW -0.43
(-6.33)
GNW -0.22
(-1.91)
CI -0.3
(-3.29)
R2
Nobs
0.55 0.58 0.55 0.56
555 555 555 555
Dependent variable:marginal profit 11K•
Marginalprofit proxied by average profit gross
of corporate taxes as a share of the capital stock
(7r). See also notes to Table 1andAppendix A.
T-statistics in parenthesis.
36Table 3: Profits: revernie components.
_________(1) (2) (3)
HK(—1)
HK(—2)
C
TLAB
TYB
TIND
0.66 0.68 0.68
(17.03)(17.45)(17.54)
0.03 0.02 0.02
(1.16)(0.83)(0.82)
-0.07-0.10-0.10
(-3.04)(-4.56)(-4.70)
-0.16
(-4.25)
0.02
(0.31)
-0.008
(-0.13)
2
Nobs
0.57 0.56 0.56
555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit IlK'
Marginal profit proxied by average profit
gross of corporate taxes as a share of the
capital stock (ir). See also notes to Table
1 and Appendix A. T-statistics in paren-
thesis.
37Table 4: Investment equation: benchmark regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
)
A(—1)
0.10 0.10 0.05 0.06
(8.95) (8.35) (8.75) (8.48)
0.007 0.008 -0.005 0.05
(0.63) (0.68) (-0.89) (7.35)
R2
AR(1)coef.
Nob.s
0.52 0.51 0.50 0.56
0.39,0.78 0.49,0.80 0.43,0.77 0.50,0.80
537 537 551 537
Dependent variable: investment rate (I/K). Marginal
profit proxied by average profit gross of corporate taxes
as a share of the capital stock (ir) in column 1 and 4, by
average profit net of the corporate tax rate as a share of
the capital stock (ir*) in column 2, by sales to capital ratio
(S/K) in column 3. Variables are in levels, and detrended
allowing for country specific linear and quadratic term.
We allow the AR(1) coefficient to differ across countries.
The lowest and highest values are reported. T-statistics in
parenthesis.
38Table 5: Dynamic effects of fiscal shocks.
0 yr.lyr.2 yrs. 3 yrs. 4 yrs. 5.yrs. sumsum sum
0to5 OtolO 0to20
Effects of a unitary shock
C _.16**_.17**_.16**_.13** -10 _.07*_.80** 95**_.98**
R Q7*-.06-.04-.010.000.00-.18 -.16 -.16
Net effect-.23-.23-.20-.14-.10-.07-.98 -1.11-1.14
TRAN -22**-24**-22**-19**-15**-11*-1 13** -1 34**-1 38**
CW -51**-64**-58**-47**-34**-23*-2 77** 3 08 3 15'
CINV -39**-38**-32*-25*-18*-13*-1 64*-1 89*-1 95*
TLAB -.17**-.18**.14* .09*-.06-.03.69* 74* 75*
See notes to Table 1 and Appendix A. **(*)indicates that zero is outside the 95% (68%)
confidence band.
39Table 6: GDP in the profit equation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS2SLS2SLS
IIK(—1)
ITK(—2)
R
C
GDPP
GDPP (—1)
0.51 0.53 0.56 0.55
(14.98)(12.83) (15.76) (15.60)
-0.13-0.07-0.08-0.09
(-5.11)(-2.26)(-2.94)(-3.33)
-0.08-0.09-0.08-0.08
(-3.09)(-3.28)(-3.21)(-3.20)
-0.094-0.11-0.09-0.09
(-5.27)(-5.49)(-5.13)(-5.18)
0.27 0.19 0.20
(16.05) (8.45)(9.39)
0.15
(7.49) 2
Nobs
0.70 0.60 0.69 0.69
555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit ilK. Marginal profit
proxied by average profit gross of corporate taxes as a share
of the capital stock (ir). See also notes to Table 1 and
Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
GDPP =(GDP-Government Consumption)/K
Instruments in (3) HK(—1), flK(—2), R, C, GDP(—1)
Instruments in (4) flK(—1), flK(—2), R, C, CDP (—1),
R(—1), G(—1).
40Table 7: Profits, labor costs and fiscal policy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2SLS2SLS2SLS2SLS2SLS2SLS2SLS2SLS
flK(—1)
HK(—2)
WP
CDPP
0.55 0.66 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.66 0.55 0.54
(12.02)(16.70) (15.49) (15.40) (12.17) (16.79) (15.65) (15.61)
0.07 0.03-0.08-0.08 0.06 0.02-0.08-0.08
(2.15)(0.93)(-2.86)(-3.02)(1.86)(0.83)(-2.85)(-3.06)
-0.19-0.07-0.08-0.08-0.16-0.07-0.07-0.07
(-6.47)(-4.62)(-6.00)(-6.22)(-4.88)(-4.08)(-5.27)(-5.14)
0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18
(8.56)(9.04) (8.26)(8.72)
f?2
Nobs
0.56 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.58 0.59 0.71 0.71
555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit (fiK). Marginal profit proxied by average profit gross
of corporate taxes as a share of the capital stock (ir). See also notes to Table 1 and Appendix
A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
WP=log of real labor compensation rate of the business sector
GDPP =(GDP-Government Consumption) /K
Instruments in (1) flK(—1), HK(—2), GW
Instruments in (2) HK(—1), HK(—2), GW, WP(—1)
Instruments in (3) LIK(—1),HK(—2),GW, WP(—l), GDP(—l)
Instruments in (4) HK(—1), HK(—2), GW, WP(—1), CDP(—1) ,TLAB
Instruments in (5) LIK(—1), HK(—2), C
Instruments in (6) HK(—1), flK(—2), C, WP(—1)
Instruments in (7) HK(—1), HK(—2), G, WP(—1), GDP(—1)
Instruments in (8) HK(—1), IIK(—2), G, WP(—1), GDP(—1) ,R.
41Table 8: Labor costs and fiscal policy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HKH1)
flK(—2)
CW
-0.60
(-5.09)
0.14
(1.58)
2.28
(11.06)
-0.02
(-0.21)
0.08
(1.24)
0.81
(4.95)
0.29
(2.91)
0.26
(3.74)
0.92
(5.80)
0.31
(3.16)
0.25
(3.60)
0.82
(5.02)
-0.64
(-5.37)
0.20
(2.14)
-0.03
(-0.31)
0.10
(1.59)
0.25
(2.54)
0.27
(3.89)
0.24
(2.43)
0.27
(3.90)
TLAB 0.20
(2.47)
C 0.61
(9.26)
0.17
(3.37)
0.19
(3.79)
0.19
(3.83)
R -0.04
(-0.62)
WP(—1) 0.72
(22.46)
0.75
(23.96)
0.75
(23.79)
0.74
(23.22)
0.78
(24.56)
0.77
(23.88)
CDPP(—1) -0.29
(-6.27)
-0.29
(-6.31)
-0.27
(-5.76)
-0.27
(-5.71)
t2 0.24 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.20 0.60 0.62 0.62
Nobs 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555
This table displays the first stage regressions for the corresponsing 2SLS regressions of Table 7.
Dependent variable: WP=log of real labor compensation rate of the business sector.
T-statistics in parenthesis. See Table 1 and Appendix A.
42Table 9: Profits and investment: estimation in differences.
0.41
Nobs 544
R2 0.12
Nobs 507
Dependent variables: change in marginal
profit /HK in column 1 and change
investment rate .A(I/K) in column 2.
Change in marginal profit proxied by
change in average profit gross of corporate
taxes as a share of the capital stock (sir).
Variables are in first differences. Country
fixed effects are included. Revenues (R)
and primary spending (G) are cyclically
adjusted and in share of trend GDP. See
also Appendix A. T-statistics in parenthe-
LA
(2)
0.01
(7.97)
(1)
LITK(—1)0.28
(7.02)
LHK(—2)0.16
(5.08)
-0.28
(-6.61)
-0.17
(-4.35)
A(—1) 0.003
(2.02)
sis.
43Table 10: Dynamic effects of fiscal shocks: estimation in differences.
0 yr.lyr.2 yrs.3 yrs.4 yrs. 5.yrs. sum
Oto5
sum
OtolO
sum
0to20
Effectsof a unitary shock
C - 1- 13'- 13**- 14**- 14**-14**-77**-1 49**-2 93**
R -.14-. 15**.15**-. 15** .87**1.64**
Net effect-.21-.27-.28-.29-.29-.29-1.64-3.13-6.12
TRAN -.06-.08-.08-.09-.09-.09-.48 -.95 -1.88
CW - 35**- 49**- 52**- 53**- 54**-55**3 005 79** 39**
GINV - 21**- 27**- 29**- 3Q**- 31*-31*-1 69**3 26**-6 39*
TLAB .15**.20**.21**.21**.22** .22** 1.20**2.30**
See notes to Table 9 and Appendix A.
**(*)indicates that zero is outside the 95% (68%) confidence band.
44Table 11: Variable discount factor.
,\prof(—1) 0.03
(2.71)
Arint(-1) -0.05
(-4.28)
Actax -0.007
(-0.58)
Actax(-1) 0.01
(1.10)
(1) (2)
Aprof 0.08
(6.72)
r(—1)0.45
(9.78)
r(—2) -0.21
(-4.83)
R 0.27
(2.98)
C -0.13
(-2.10)
Xrint -0.06
(-5.76)
2 0.20R2
AR(1)coef.
0.59
0.48,0.80
Nobs429Nobs 429
Dependent variables: real ex-post interest rate
run column 1 and investment rate I/K in col-
umn 2. See also notes to Table 1 and Appendix
A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
45Table 12: Profits: revenue components, with year dummies.
__________(1) (2) (3) (4)
HK(—1)
HK(—2)
G
R
TLAB
TYB
TIND
0.69
(17.81)
0.68
(17.37)
0.70
(17.66)
0.69
(17.81)
0.06
(1.95)
0.06
(2.05)
0.05
(1.72)
0.05
(1.71)
-0.04
(-1.75)
-0.03
(-1.21)
-0.06
(-2.66)
-0.06
(-2.68)
-0.12
(-4.19)
-0.15
(-4.27)
0.02
(0.36)
-0.12
R2
Nobs
0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65
555 555 555 555
Dependent variable: marginal profit 1TKMarginal
profit proxied by average profit gross of corporate
taxes as a share of the capital stock (ir). Year dum-
mies are included. See also notes to Table 1 and Ap-
pendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
46Table 13: Profits: spending components, with year dummies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HKH1)0.69
(17.84)
0.67
(17.51)
0.69
(17.92)
0.69
(17.71)
HK(2)
R
0.05
(1.77)
-0.13
(-4.50)
0.07
(2.39)
-0.12
(-4.05)
0.05
(1.76)
-0.13
(-4.70)
0.05
(1.89)
-0.13
(-4.76)
TRAN-0.006
(-0.12)
GW -0.29
(-4.15)
GNW -0.001
(-0.01)
CI -0.18
(-2.04)
R2 0.66 0.67 0.66 0.66
Nobs 555 555 555 555
-
Dependentvariable: marginal profit 11K•Marginal
profit proxied by average profit gross of corporate
taxes as a share of the capital stock (ir). Year dum-
mies are included. See also notes to Table 1 and Ap-
pendix A. T-statistics in parenthesis.
47Table 14: Investment equation and financial constraints.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
71* -0.04
(-0.54)
71*(1) 0.07
(1.78)
A 0.09
(5.73)
0.07
(3.69)
A(—1) 0.03
(1.64)
0.04
(0.40)
E_1 [irt] 0.30
(9.38)
0.25
(3.56)
0.25
(2.38)
Lag (E_1 [ITt]) -0.005
(-0.16)
0.01
(0.18)
-0.05
(-0.46)
E_1 {a/3ITt+j] 0.18
(9.26)
0.14
(9.14)
0.03
(0.85)
0.04
(0.52)
LagE_i [=a/3ITt+j] 0.0020.005-0.0060.04
(0.13)(0.34)(0.85)(0.47)
AR(1)coef. 0.45
0.80
0.47
0.79
0.46,
0.73
0.48,
0.73
0.46,
0.73
0.41,
0.78
0.41,
0.77
Nobs 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
Dep. var: Investment rate=(I/K)
(1) Instruments: G, G(-1), R, R(-1), ), )(-1), 7rK(—1)
(4) a =O,b=1
(5) a=O,b=2
(6) a =1,b —cc
(7) a= 1,b=2
T-statistics in parenthesis. See Table 1 and Appendix A.
48Table 15: Fiscal adjustments: Fiscal policy and macroeconomic indicators.
Expansionary Contractionary
Bef.Dur.Aft.Aft.-BefBef.Dur.Aft.Aft.-Bef.
Primary Spending 42.9641.7141.36-1.6040.3240.2440.15-0.17
(1.43)(1.42)(1.35)
* (1.36)(1.37)(1.40)
Total Revenue 40.1041.4241.57 1.47 36.9739.0339.65 2.69
(1.45)(1.43) (1.41)
* (1.48)(1.51)(1.58)
*
GDP Growth rate -0.79-0.45-0.190.60 0.82-1.12-0.86 -1.68
(deviation from G7)(0.24)(0.33) (0.31) (0.40)(0.44)(0.28)
*
GDP Growth rate 1.312.653.41 2.10 3.731.341.91 -1.82
(0.24)(0.39)(0.29)
* (0.37)(0.34)(0.27)
*
A Priv.Consumption1.162.303.03 1.87 3.761.191.84 -1.93
(0.36)(0.38)(0.30)
* (0.55)(0.45)(0.31)
*
A Bus.Investment -0.363.495.24 5.60 4.59-0.390.29 -4.30
(0.99)(1.24)(1.13) * (1.22) (1.60)(1.31) *
Contribution to real
GDP Growth from
Priv.Consumption51.37 51.0951.820.45 58.4148.9257.78-0.63
Bus.Investment -6.5516.4417.1723.7213.40-7.22-0.84-14.23
Residen.Investment-23.780.192.9026.69 4.88-7.071.15 -3.73
Stockbuilding -16.081.587.6023.68 2.122.16-12.28-14.39
Net Export 69.3629.604.08-65.28-2.3330.6037.0439.37
Gov.Consumption 28.286.3712.71-15.5717.9527.2520.01 2.06
Gov.Investment -6.86-6.942.23 9.09 3.54-10.95-4.86 -8.40
Source OECD: Primary Spending and Total Revenue are in share of trend GDP and cyclically
adjusted. GDP Growth rate(G7) is real GDP growth in deviation from the average (GDP weights)
G7 real growth rate. zxPriv.Consumption and Bus.Investment are growth rate of real private
consumption and real business investment. The contributions to real GDP growth from the different
GDP components have been calculated using the following formula.
Let th= the contribution to real GDP growth from the X component: .[((X—X,_1)/X_ 1)*X_i /GDP_'] sh =
An episode of fiscal adjustment is expansionary (contractionary) if the primary cyclically adjusted
balance as a share of trend GDP improves by at least 2% in one year or by 1.25% in two consecutive
years and the average real GDP growth in each adjustment year and in the two years after is greater
(lower) than the average real GDP growth in the o years before.Table 16: Business Investment around fiscal adjustments.
_________________ Expansionary Contractionary
Bef.Dur.Aft. Duff.Bef.Dur.Aft. Duff.
(a) (b) (c)(c-a)(a) (b) (c)(c-a)
Data
GDP Growth rate 1.312.653.412.103.731.341.91-1.82
(0.24)(0.39) (0.29)
* (0.37)(0.34)(0.27)
*
Bus.Investment -0.363.495.245.604.59-0.390.29-4.30
(0.99)(1.24) (1.13)
*
(1.22)(1.60)(1.31)
*
Bus.Investmentcontribution -6.5516.4417.17 23.72 13.40-7.22-0.84 -14.23
to GDP Growth
Benchmark model
Bus.Investment 1.012.354.053.042.644.560.08-2.56
Bus.Investment contribution7.1110.0313.126.016.9741.13-0.06-7.04
to GDP Growth
Model with GDP and
variable discount factor
Bus.Investment 0.06-0.594.194.133.852.82-0.83-4.68
Bus.Investment contribution -2.50-4.8313.12 15.6211.8226.79-5.86-17.69
to GDP Growth
I
SeeTable 15.
50Figure 1
Effect of an increase in public employment, labor taxes, or unemployment benefits
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KT i KT0 KT